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Abstract: Since the end of the Cold War, security studies have broadened to take into account a wide 
range of non-military threats ranging from poverty to environmental concerns rather than just national 
defense.  Security scholars, backed by international organizations and a growing number of national 
governments, have developed the concept of Human Security, focusing on the welfare of ordinary people 
against a broad range of threats.  This has aroused vigorous debate. Part I of this paper proposes an analytical 
model of Human Security. Part II argues that it is important to measure how ordinary people perceive risks, moving 
beyond state-centric notions of Human Security.  We examine new evidence, drawing upon survey items 
specially designed to monitor perceptions of Human Security, included for the first time in the 6th wave of the 
World Values Survey (WVS), with fieldwork conducted in 2010-2012.Part III demonstrates that people 
distinguish three dimensions: national, community, and personal security and then explores some structural 
determinants driving these perceptions. Part IV discusses why perceptions of Human Security matter, in 
particular for explaining cultural values and value change around the world.   The conclusion argues that the 
shift from a narrow focus on military security toward the broader concept of Human Security is a natural 
response to the changing challenges facing developed societies, in which the cost-benefit ratio concerning war 
has become negative and cultural changes have made war less acceptable.  In this setting, valid measures of 
perceptions of Human Security have become essential, both to understand the determinants of Human 
Security among ordinary people, and to analyze their consequences.  
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Since the end of the Cold War, security studies have broadened to take into account a wide range of 
non-military threats, such as environmental problems, disease epidemics, poverty, nationalism, terrorism, 
failing states, and vulnerable information systems. Security scholars, backed by international organizations and 
a growing number of national governments, have developed the concept of Human Security, focusing on the 
welfare of ordinary people facing a broad range of threats, including national defense but extending well 
beyond it.   
Not surprisingly, the attempt to revise traditional understandings of security has aroused vigorous 
debate.1 Proponents contend that this reconceptualization dissolves conventional disciplinary boundaries and 
existing paradigms, so that the links between multiple risks and threats are better understood in an 
increasingly complex and globalized world.2In response, traditionalists argue that Human Security is a 
muddled, value-laden, and confusing catch-all notion, where a mélange of diverse challenges are ‘securitized’, 
without providing any additional analytical leverage for scholars or practical utility for policy analysts.3 The 
conventional conception of security, traditionalists suggest, emphasizing the role of the state indefending 
national interests against external threats, provides a sharper focus. Scholarly debate about these issues has 
been mainly theoretical and normative. Researchers have started to explore the empirical evidence, however; 
hence discourse analysis has been utilized to determine whether the concept of Human Security has 
penetrated the diplomatic language framing foreign policy speeches and official documents. 4 Several case-
studies have examined whether the actions of leading advocates reflect the principles of Human Security, 
such as the foreign policies of Canada and Japan.5 Studies have attempted to construct Human Security 
Indexes, based on national-level data.6 By contrast, little empirical work has sought to measure subjective 
perceptions of Human Security among ordinary people, to compare these perceptions among and within 
diverse societies worldwide, to identify the core drivers of this phenomenon, still less to analyze the 
consequences for cultural change. 
To address these issues, this study starts by considering alternative understandings of the concept of 
Human Security. Part I proposes a model of Human Security, generating propositions that are theoretically 
important and empirically testable. Our theory predicts that experience of ‘objective’ structural conditions, at 
national, community and personal levels, will affect perceptions of Human Security. Thus feelings of 
vulnerability to risk and threat will be stronger among those experiencing major wars or natural disasters, 
growing up in risky neighborhoods, and among the more susceptible sectors of the population, such as the 
elderly, the poor, women, and those with fewer skills and education. Security perceptions are also expected to 
be conditioned by the social safety nets provided by the family, community, and welfare state, which can 
mitigate risks, as well as by the depiction of threats and dangers  conveyed in mass communications (the 
‘mean world ‘effect). In turn, security perceptions are predicted to shape a wide range of cultural values, 
including feelings of well-being and happiness, social trust and tolerance, the strength of religiosity, and FOUR HORSEMEN  10/13/2011 10:10 AM 
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political orientations, such as support for right-wing parties, attitudes towards gender equality, and sexual 
liberalization values. 
Part II in this study discusses a new measure which operationalizes perceptions of Human Security. 
In the previous literature, Human Security has been measured at the level of nation-states. The most 
ambitious attempts to create a composite Human Security Index have sought to compare national-level 
inequalities worldwide based on internationally-standardized official statistics.  Measures have constructed 
threshold estimates (to gauge the severity of threats) using indices in each society, such as poverty (GDP per 
capita), food (the proportion under-nourished), health (child mortality rates), environment (access to water), 
personal security (the political terror scale) and political security (press freedom).7This approach is useful but 
it is also limited, since mean and median scores can disguise substantial disparities within societies, and the 
existence of marked inequalities in security among vulnerable populations. There are no clear principles to 
select and weight the components parts nor the appropriate threshold.  The measures are therefore 
constructed on an ad hoc basis, selecting variables arbitrarily, often based on data availability, without 
monitoring to what extent they actually impact on a given people’s sense of risks and threats. It also remains 
unclear what value the composite measures add for public policymakers.  Saying that a country such as 
Somalia or Haiti ranks low in overall Human Security (which seems intuitively obvious) tells us nothing about 
whether donor aid should be spent strategically on, say, training the police force, funding water wells, or 
supporting clinics.  The macro-level composite measures are also conceptually flawed, since they perpetuate a 
state-centric perspective. To develop more specific and policy-relevant insights, measures of Human Security 
ideally need to be analyzed at the individual-level. The measure used in this study therefore compares how 
ordinary people perceive risks. This strategy allows the analysts to then re-aggregate the data, for example to 
monitor how far perceptions of Human Security vary among women and men, rich and poor households, 
those living in the rural periphery and those in the urban center, different ethno-religious or ethno-linguistic 
communities, and to measure the drivers of peoples’ sense of security.  This measure also facilitates 
comparisons of what shapes a sense of security across countries, types of societies or regimes, and global 
regions. Evidence is drawn from a new battery of survey items designed to monitor perceptions of Human 
Security, included for the first time in the 6th wave of the World Values Survey (with fieldwork conducted in 
2010-2012). Data for this wave continues to be collected, but we examine some preliminary results. The 
available evidence allows us to compare several diverse nations, including rich societies and long-established 
democracies, such as Sweden and the United States, as well as several middle-income and poorer developing 
societies from different global regions. Dimensions of perceived Human Security are measured and compared 
across and within societies. 
Part III explores the structure and dimensions of perceptions of Human Security, using factor 
analysis. The results suggest that the public distinguishes between three components or dimensions: national FOUR HORSEMEN  10/13/2011 10:10 AM 
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security (the broadest level, in terms of threats from armed conflict), community security (including threats from 
the surrounding neighborhood), and personal security (involving risks and threats to the self and family). Thus 
the object of the security risks appears to be as important to most people as the cause of the threat. The results 
suggest, as traditionalists emphasize, that concern about the risks to the nation-state arising from internal 
violence, inter-state war and terrorism remains an important and distinct dimension of public perceptions of 
Human Security, focused on ‘freedom from fear’. Nevertheless the findings also lend some support to the 
revisionist perspective, by emphasizing that perceptions of Human Security also encompass and recognize 
other important types of threat and risk, such as those arising from crime and illicit drugs, and personal 
insecurity from lack of food or income, emphasizing ‘freedom from want’. Further analysis suggests that each 
dimension of perceived Human Security can be explained most plausibly by a distinctive range of structural 
conditions. For example, as might be expected, the analysis shows that reported levels of household income 
and wealth have far strong effects on feelings of personal insecurity(such as going without food or medical 
treatment), than on feelings of national insecurity(such as the risks of war and armed conflict).  
Part IV discusses why perceptions of Human Security matter, impacting feelings of human well-
being and happiness, social tolerance, and cultural values around the world.   The conclusion argues that 
more robust and conceptually valid measures of perceptions of Human Security are essential, both to 
understand this phenomenon at the individual-level, and also to analyze its consequences. In a series of 
previous publications, we have theorized that perceptions of Human Security have major cultural 
implications, including for trends in religiosity and secularization, for attitudes towards gender equality, and 
for general processes of value change.8  The new evidence allows these predictions to be tested more 
systematically and more rigorously than ever before. Understanding perceptions of Human Security is 
emerging as a promising research agenda with the capacity to transform the predominant paradigm in security 
studies, shifting the focus from military violence to other severe threats, and from states to peoples. 
I: The concept of Human Security 
The United Nations has often pioneered concepts which have been widely disseminated, such as 
‘human development’, ‘sustainable environments’ and ‘good governance’. The intellectual roots of the UN’s 
work in promoting general ideas of human security can be traced back to the 1940s.9 Dr. Mahbub ul Haq first 
drew the widespread attention to the concept of Human Security in the seminal United Nations 
Development Programme's 1994 Human Development Report. “The concept of security “has for too long been interpreted 
narrowly: as security of territory from external aggression, or as protection of national interests in foreign policy or as global 
security from the threat of nuclear holocaust....Forgotten were the legitimate concerns of ordinary people who sought security in their 
daily lives.”10 This report proposed seven major components of Human Security: (1) economic security; (2) 
food security; (3) health security; (4) environmental security; (5) personal security (safety from such things as 
torture, war, criminal attacks, domestic violence, drug use, suicide, and  traffic accidents; (6) community FOUR HORSEMEN  10/13/2011 10:10 AM 
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security (the survival of traditional cultures and ethnic groups); and (7) political security (the enjoyment of 
civil and political rights, and freedom from political oppression).11 Human security was also envisaged in the 
report as universal (applying to all people and societies), interdependent (where diverse types of threats are linked 
together), preventative (where the primary concern is to ameliorate and reduce the causes of insecurity), and 
people-centered (focusing upon individuals not just relationships among nation-states). The report also 
introduced the important notion of subjective security -- what makes people feel safe -- referring to ‘Human 
Security as people see it’, in contrast to objective indicators of income inequality or armed violence.  
The core idea therefore expands the concept of security beyond narrow conceptions of state defense 
against external military threats.   Human Security recognizes the complex links between ‘freedom from fear’ 
and ‘freedom from want’, anticipated decades earlier in Franklin D. Roosevelt’s speech (1941).12  In this 
regard, the revisionist conception promises to reintegrate separate scholarly disciplines focused upon military 
security and international development.   
Moreover, and equally importantly, the concept also refers to the comprehensive protection of peoples, 
not just the security of states.  This shifts beyond the state-centric analysis that has dominated international 
relations during the post-Westphalian era to focus upon a wide range of actors, including individuals, social 
groups, and local communities.  It recognizes that states may function as the primary protection for their 
citizens – but that repressive states may also be their abusers. It also breaks down the dichotomous 
classifications of developed and developing nations, recognizing that prosperous and secure citizens living in 
Cape Town may have more in common with similar citizens in Sydney, Santiago, and Stockholm, than with 
their countrymen in Johannesburg, Durban and Pretoria. Beyond this minimal agreement, however, there is 
no shared consensus about the precise boundaries of this notion. 
The 1994 Human Development Report influenced the language and principles of external relations and 
international affairs among the governments of several major powers. Canada, Norway and Japan led the way 
by incorporating notions of Human Security into their foreign policies, although with differing 
conceptualizations.13  In 1998, governments, led by Canada and Norway, established a “Human Security 
network” of states and nongovernmental organizations that endorse the concept.14Japan also promoted this 
framework, emphasizing threats from economic crisis, social safety nets, global warming, transnational crime, 
refugees, human rights violations, landmines and child soldiers.15 Japan actively furthered the idea within the 
international community by funding several initiatives, including the UN Commission on Human Security. 
16In 2000 and 2004 the Swedish parliament passed resolutions that have transformed the role of the Swedish 
Armed Forces.  Previously, the Swedish military had been mainly oriented toward repelling an invasion of 
Swedish territory, but the risk of invasion is now seen as low.  The new policy holds that: “Defending a nation 
has historically been equivalent to protecting its borders. Today, defending a nation can take place far away, through creating 
peace, stability and prosperity in turbulent parts of the world. In this manner, defending a nation has come to include defending its FOUR HORSEMEN  10/13/2011 10:10 AM 
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values, and protecting democracy or human rights.” Accordingly, Swedish Armed Forces personnel are now mainly 
involved in international peace support and humanitarian operations, carried out in such places as 
Afghanistan, Kosovo, Bosnia, Liberia, DRC and Lebanon.  Similarly, in 2008 the Australian government 
announced that its new defense policy would incorporate Human Security concerns such as the environment, 
terrorism and crime, energy security, infectious diseases and global demographic changes, as well as national 
security.17  Another major change in international politics-- the rising emphasis on the concept of Human 
Rights that has emerged in recent decades-- is closely related to the growing emphasis on Human Security.  
The European Union has not formally adopted the Human Security framework for its external relations but 
Mary Kaldor argues that many of its policy priorities and principles, including concepts of crisis management, 
civil-military cooperation, and conflict management, have been framed in the language of Human Security.18 
Several critics charge that the adoption of the Human Security framework is ‘the dog that did not bark’, 
mainly affecting the language and discourse used to frame and justify external relations by several 
governments, without profoundly altering practices.19 Others scholars suggest that the new thinking has now 
gone beyond rhetoric to guide external relations among leading proponents, such as Canada and Japan, as 
well as generating several new human security-driven examples of state and non-state actor collaboration, 
exemplified in the Ottawa Convention on landmines, the Kimberley Process on conflict diamonds, and the 
establishment of the International Criminal Court.20 
The idea of Human Security continues to stir debate among scholars in international relations and 
development studies. One reason for the popularity of this concept lies in the attempt to understand the 
changing functions of security forces in recent decades, in which the international community has expanded 
peace-keeping operations following both intra-state and civil wars.21 Interventions have broadened in scope 
well beyond the provision of blue-helmet security to cover challenges of overcoming human suffering, 
economic destruction, social reconstruction, and securing agreement for new constitutional settlements. The 
expansion has been fuelled by widespread concern that societies deeply-divided  by conflict and violence, 
where long-standing autocracies have collapsed, are breeding grounds for terrorism, organized crime, 
weapons proliferation, humanitarian emergencies, environmental degradation, genocide, and political 
extremism.22 Experience with peace-keeping operations in trouble-spots such as  Somalia,  Timor Leste, 
Sierra Leone, and the Democratic Republic of the Congo, has spurred renewed efforts to understand the 
challenges of military security and social reconstruction.   The core role of international peace-keeping forces 
to reduce inter-communal violence,  clear land-mines, and collect small arms, and has expanded so that today 
the military have become inextricably concerned with such challenges as distributing food and medical aid, 
supervising reconstruction efforts, facilitating processes of negotiated settlement and constitution-building, 
and expanding the capacity of local security services. Reflecting these developments, proponents argue that 
the concept of Human Security has the potential to be paradigm-shifting within international relations, FOUR HORSEMEN  10/13/2011 10:10 AM 
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dissolving traditional disciplinary barriers which have divided scholars studying territorial defense from others 
focused upon issues of international development, economic growth, social protection, regime transitions and 
processes of democratization.23 The interdisciplinary study of Human Security brings together experts on 
issues of human rights, crisis management and vulnerable populations, conflict resolution, and international 
development as well as military security. 
This shift in elite thinking reflects changing value priorities found among the publics of advanced 
industrial societies. When states first emerged, their primary function was to maintain a monopoly of 
violence, defending their people against internal violence and conquest by outsiders.  This was crucial to 
survival because food was scarce.  Throughout most of history, population rose to meet the available food 
supply, and most people lived at the subsistence level.  Violence was necessary to protect the scarce means of 
sustenance.  The elite that maintained a monopoly of violence tended to appropriate any surplus for 
themselves leaving the masses at the subsistence level, but with the advantages of being exploited by 
stationary bandits rather than roving ones.  Under these conditions, security studies largely boiled down to 
the study of military security. 
This has been changing, starting with the economic miracles of the post-war era, and accelerating 
with the end of the Cold War.  A concept of Human Security has emerged, still embracing military security 
but now including a much broader range of concerns. Among developed nations, inter-state war has become 
less widespread for two reasons: it has become (1) less cost-effective and (2) less acceptable to the publics of 
developed democracies.  At the same time, globalization and cultural change have made other concerns such 
as environmental protection and human rights increasingly prominent.  These developments reflect 
economic, technological and social changes linked with modernization.  A massive body of survey evidence 
demonstrates that in countries that have experienced rising levels of economic and physical security, mass 
value priorities have been shifting from a relatively narrow focus on survival, toward a broader range of goals.  
In response, governments in several developed countries have been expanding their security policy priorities 
from military defense to the broader concept of Human Security. Given the persistence of enduring poverty, 
disease, and conflict around the world -- key drivers of fear and want -- it is critical to monitor threats to 
Human Security and to diagnose the most important determinants of success and failure in reducing risks.  
[Figure 1] 
The heuristic model presented in Figure 1 can be used to understand perceptions of Human Security. 
The core components are only sketched in here although the logic can be briefly described.  Our theory 
predicts that perceptions of Human Security will reflect experience with ‘objective’ structural conditions, at 
global and national (macro), community (meso) and personal (micro) levels. Thus perceptions of insecurity 
will be stronger among those living through major wars or natural disasters, growing up in risky FOUR HORSEMEN  10/13/2011 10:10 AM 
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neighborhoods, and among the more vulnerable sectors of the population, such as the elderly, the poor, 
women, and less educated. The exact weight and influence of each of these factors remains to be determined, 
however, for example whether socio-tropic or ego-tropic evaluations of risks have the strongest impact on 
security perceptions.  Drawing upon the public health literature, a large body of research has studied the 
relationship between objective indices of risks and subjective assessments of threats. Security perceptions 
seem to be conditioned by the social safety nets provided by the family, community and the welfare state, 
which can mitigate risks. Informal networks function as the first form of support, mitigating care of the 
elderly or children, and coping with natural disasters. Philanthropic and religious organizations, trade unions, 
and other cooperative associations and local networks can also provide help in time of need.  Security 
perceptions are also expected to be affected by the depiction of threats and dangers conveyed in mass 
communications (the ‘mean world ‘effect).  
In turn, as discussed in the final part of this paper, security perceptions are predicted to shape a wide 
range of cultural values, including feelings of well-being and happiness, social trust and tolerance, the strength 
of religiosity, and political orientations, such as support for right-wing parties, attitudes towards gender 
equality, and sexual liberalization values.  In this preliminary study, we cannot set out the full evidence 
demonstrating the connections among all the components in our theory, which is part of a larger research 
project. But we will develop and operationalize the core measure of perceptions of security and illustrate 
some of the relationships with preliminary WVS data. 
The concept of Human Security still remains highly controversial, and questions have been raised 
about the concept’s theoretical coherence. Many traditionalists contest the theoretical coherence of the idea, 
arguing that the notion is conceptually vague and normatively-driven, reflecting a ‘shopping list’ of diverse 
popular concerns,  that should be kept analytically separate. Dispute remains about whether to adopt narrow 
or extended definitions, with traditionalists charging that, the broadness of the potential range of threats 
which could be included under this idea reduces the utility and precision of the concept.24If everything 
becomes a matter of ‘security’ – from food security to environmental security, political security, and economic 
security, then traditionalists believe that the word loses its core meaning and simply becomes a rhetorical 
rallying cry. Where issues such as famine, HIV-AIDS and climate change become ‘securitized’, this process 
increases their claims to priority and attention on the policy agenda and budget.  
Even if acknowledged as theoretically important, the idea is also still regarded as difficult to measure 
with the rigor and precision necessary for empirical research, for monitoring risks, and for guiding strategic 
policy priorities. Critics suggest that the abstract concept of Human Security is so conceptually ambiguous, 
normatively-laden, and all-encompassing that it is difficult to measure with any validity, reducing its practical 
utility for scholars and policymakers. 25Insufficient efforts have been made to operationalize the term.26 As a FOUR HORSEMEN  10/13/2011 10:10 AM 
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result, the notion has not yet been employed in a coherent and precise way that could help guide policy 
priorities within the international development community.  
II: Measuring Human Security 
The measurement challenge is real – but, we argue, not insurmountable. King and Murray argue that 
Human Security is potentially open to operationalization, within the limits of the available data, by focusing 
upon the most severe threshold of a range of life-threatening risks.27 They offer a definition of Human Security 
that is intended to include only essential elements that are “important enough for human beings to fight over 
or to put their lives or property at great risk.”28 King and Murray identify five key indicators of Human 
Security —poverty, health, education, political freedom, and democracy.  Paris, however, argues that this list 
selects certain values as representing Human Security, without offering a clear justification for doing so.29 
Why is political freedom included but not, say, the threat of environmental degradation or the risks of disease 
epidemics, floods, famine? If measured by the degree of fatalities, arguably disasters have more severe effects 
than lack of political freedoms.  
Other similar attempts to construct an index based on the concept of Human Security have 
combined a range of standard indicators available at national-level, exemplified by levels of battle-related 
deaths, average longevity, rates of infant mortality, and estimates of poverty.30 But again, it remains unclear 
which macro-level indicators should be included or excluded, how these should be combined and weighted, 
and what level or threshold constitutes a ‘severe’ threat.31A widespread consensus surrounds many 
internationally-standardized measures of human development, such as those used to monitor progress 
towards meeting the Millennium Development Goals, for example concerning levels of child mortality, rates 
of tuberculosis or measles, and levels of per capita GDP. 32 Similarly the scholarly literature has developed 
standard measures of the severity of intra-state and internal armed conflict, monitored by battle-related deaths 
and casualties, such as those collected by the Uppsala Conflict Data Program (UCDP) for the PRIO Armed 
Conflict Dataset 1946-2009.33 But there is a serious aggregation problem in any broader measure: it remains 
unclear how to combine separate macro-level indicators into a rigorous, coherent and valid composite 
measure reflecting the underlying concept of Human Security.  Composite indices also lose much of the fine 
grained detail which is essential for accurate policy diagnosis and prescription; if a particular country is low in 
Human Security, is this due to natural disasters, military aggression or endemic poverty?  We would not know 
from the overall rating. 
National or Individual-level measurement 
Another reason why previous attempts to measure Human Security remain flawed, we suggest, is a 
unit of analysis problem. Previous measures remain state-centric by using macro-level indices focused on the 
nation-state. By contrast, few have attempted to compare public perceptions and experience of the different FOUR HORSEMEN  10/13/2011 10:10 AM 
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components underlying the concept of Human Security.34  Yet it is particularly important to understand what 
makes people feel safe, measured by subjective perceptions at individual-level, for several reasons.  
Firstly, as mentioned earlier, the original notion of Human Security emphasized that a distinctive 
aspect of the concept was that it was ‘people-centric’ rather than state-centric.  Common patterns of social 
inequality mean that even in affluent post-industrial economies, many sectors of society still feel excluded 
from welfare safety nets, marginalized from public affairs, and vulnerable to poverty, violent crime, and social 
deprivation.  Individual-level measurement is essential since people and groups can still feel vulnerable to 
existential threats even in rich and stable societies. The powerful notion of Human Security therefore cuts 
across thinking based on simple global comparisons between states:  Human Security is a particularly serious 
challenge for the most vulnerable populations living in less developed societies and weak states, but it can also 
be a threat for all mankind. Thus we need to examine perceptions of Human Security by focusing upon the 
most vulnerable populations, such as the young and elderly, the poor and unemployed, women, and refugees, 
migrants, minority groups, as well as comparing how Human Security varies geographically within countries 
by sub-region and among those living in the rural periphery and major cities. Expanding social inequality in 
many societies, even those such as China and India with rapid national economic growth, makes this issue 
particularly important.  
Moreover a substantial literature in social psychology, communications and public health suggests 
that there can be major discrepancies between ‘objective’ and ‘subjective’ perceptions of risk and threat. Thus, 
for example,   the ‘mean world effect’ literature, based on cultivation theories of American public opinion, 
suggests that official rates of violent crime monitored in policy statistics can fall, making communities safer 
places to live, although the public believes that the risks of crime have risen, due to exposure to extensive 
coverage of violent crime on local TV news coverage or watching crime drama programs highlighting this 
issue.35  Similarly our ability to identify the health risks arising from diet, smoking, or lack of exercise with any 
degree of accuracy are widely recognized to be flawed, whether due to perceptual biases, limited cognitive 
skills, or lack of adequate information. We therefore need to be able to compare perceptual and ‘objective’ 
indices of security, to understand this complex relationship. By approaching the operationalization of Human 
Security and monitoring individual-level perceptions, it also can be established whether ordinary people living 
in different types of society regard severe threats to their lives as essentially one-dimensional, or  whether 
people distinguish among different types of risks.  
Evidence, comparative framework and survey data 
Evidence presented in this study draws upon a new battery of survey items designed to monitor 
perceptions of Human Security, included for the first time in the 6th wave of the World Values Survey (WVS), 
with fieldwork conducted in 2010-2012. At present, data for the 6th Wave of the World Values Survey FOUR HORSEMEN  10/13/2011 10:10 AM 
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continues to be collected, but the currently available data allows comparisons to be drawn among and within 
several diverse societies. This include some nations ranked as highest in the world by the UNDP 2010 
Human Development Index, with stable democracies as well as high levels of national security, including the 
United States, Sweden, Japan, the Republic of Korea, and Spain. The latter two societies have also registered 
remarkable progress in human development and democratization during the third wave era. The comparison 
also includes several diverse countries from different global regions enjoying moderate to low levels of human 
development– including Trinidad and Tobago, and Morocco.  The countries included in the comparative 
framework also allow comparison among societies which have developed diverse types of welfare states and 
social safety-nets, such as contrasts between Sweden and the United States. Comparisons can be drawn 
among regimes governed by traditional monarchies (Morocco), presidential executives (including the United 
States) and parliamentary democracies (such as Spain), with dissimilar historical experience of regime 
transitions and processes of democratization. Societies also vary in their recent experience with armed 
conflict, both at home and abroad; hence Spain has contended with violence in the Basque region, and the 
Republic of Korea faces severe military threats across the border from the North. Countries such as the 
United States and Sweden also differ sharply in their foreign policies, military capacity, and willingness to 
deploy armed force abroad. The exploratory generalizations based on the preliminary analysis of these 
countries will be tested in an even broader range of nations following release of the full set of WVS data from 
2010-2012. 
Part III: Public perceptions of Human Security 
The 6th Wave of the WVS survey included a series of items designed to monitor public perceptions 
of a range of risks and threats. The items are shown in details in the paper’s Technical Appendix.   Principal 
components factor analysis was employed to determine whether public perceptions were uni-dimensional or 
whether people distinguished between different types of threats. Public perceptions across all countries 
included in the pooled WVS were found to fall into three dimensions, reflecting notions of personal security, 
community security and national security. Table 1 shows the results of the factor analysis.  As it indicates, one 
dimension concerns the frequency of threats to the local community, such as robberies, illicit drugs and 
alcohol consumed in the streets in the immediate neighborhood. Another dimension concerns national 
security, including concern about terrorist attacks, inter-state war and civil war. A third dimension involves 
personal security, including the experience of going without cash income, medicine, enough food to eat and 
feeling unsafe about crime in the home.  
[Table 1 about here] 
Accordingly three normalized scales were developed by adding each of the items, standardized to a 
100-point scale for ease of comparison across each dimension. Each of the scales was reversed for analysis so FOUR HORSEMEN  10/13/2011 10:10 AM 
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as to focus upon determining some structural causes of insecurity and perceptions of risk. The results in 
Table 2 illustrate the main contrasts in mean scores in insecurity perceptions on the 100-point scales by 
society.  
[Table 2 about here] 
As might be expected, in terms of personal threats, Sweden emerged as the most secure nation, 
followed by the other post-industrial nations, with Morocco, the society with the lowest per capita income, 
proving the least secure. On average, perceptions of personal insecurity were almost twice as strong in 
Morocco as in Sweden. In terms of perceptions of community security, however, while the Japanese displayed 
the strongest feelings of neighborhood safety, the other post-industrial societies proved remarkably similar. 
Perceptions of community insecurity were strongest in the two developing societies, Morocco and Trinidad 
and Tobago.  
Lastly comparisons of national insecurity reversed some of these patterns among the countries under 
comparison. Thus fears about the threat of terrorism, civil conflict and inter-state war were greatest in Japan, 
perhaps due to the long-standing historical memories from World War II, in keeping with other indicators of 
Japanese unwillingness to engage in aggressive military actions. Citizens were also concerned about national 
security in the Republic of Korea, not surprisingly given its chronic tensions with North Korea. Since the end 
of the Korean War, the two countries have faced each other across the Demilitarized Zone, engaged most of 
the time in hostile relations with occasional, brief thaws and increasing exchanges between P'yongyang and 
Seoul. Moroccans were also worried about war, in the context of the Arab Spring, sparked by events in 
Tunisia in December 2010 and the start of the Egyptian protests in January 2011, five months before the 
Moroccan survey. Moreover Western Sahara was long the site of armed conflict between Moroccan forces 
and the POLISARIO Front, which continues to seek independence for the territory. A cease-fire has been 
fully in effect since 1991 in the UN-administered area. By contrast, the risks were perceived to be lowest in 
Sweden, reflecting its long-standing tradition of pacifism, non-alignment, and neutrality. Sweden therefore 
emerges as the country with the least concern about both national and personal forms of security.   
Interestingly, it has made striking revisions in its defense policy, shifting from a focus on national defense to 
emphasizing peace-keeping and developmental aid as the central mission of the Swedish military. 
How far do structural factors help to explain perception of security? The heuristic model used in this 
study predicts that feelings of personal insecurity will be strengthened by experience with a range of 
socioeconomic risks, including lack of income and wealth, educational qualifications and employment, and 
the working class, as well as being stronger among the elderly, women, the unmarried, and ethnic minorities. 
These factors are also expected to influence perceptions of community and national insecurity, although with FOUR HORSEMEN  10/13/2011 10:10 AM 
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progressively weaker effects. Table 3 shows the results of the OLS regression models where these factors 
were entered.  
[Table 3 about here] 
The results in the first model confirmed the impact of socioeconomic conditions on perceptions of 
personal security.  Not surprisingly, the least secure sectors of society had low levels of household income, 
wealth (savings), educational qualifications, and subjective working class status. These were all strong and 
significant predictors of personal insecurity. The elderly, second generation immigrants, and those living in 
households where the chief wage earner was unemployed were also less secure, although both sex and marital 
status proved insignificant.  
[Figure 2 about here] 
  To examine this in more detail, Figure 2 describes perceptions of personal security by income decile 
for each of the countries under comparison. The distribution shows that in general the more affluent 
households feel more secure, but the gap between rich and poor is moderate in Sweden, whereas there are 
sharp contrasts in Morocco – and in the United States. Indeed, out of all the countries under comparison, 
perceptions of personal risks are second highest among the poorest sectors of society in America. Well-
established contrasts between the generous and comprehensive ‘cradle-to-grave’ social protection policies in 
the Swedish welfare state compared with more limited provisions in the United States, especially lack of 
universal health care, are likely to contribute towards the contrasts in personal security observed among the 
low-income households in these countries. 
  The final two regression models in Table 3 examine how far social structural and demographic 
variables also explain feelings of community and national insecurity. If these feelings reflected psychological 
traits, so that anxious personalities were fearful of many types of risks and threats, then similar social 
characteristics should predict each type of insecurity. It is apparent that the effects of education and wealth 
serve to reduce insecurities across the board. These factors are often closely intertwined, since higher 
educational qualifications serve as a springboard for higher-salaried professional and managerial careers. Most 
of the other predictors of national insecurity and fear of war, however, differ from the factors driving 
personal or community insecurities. Thus for example women are far more concerned about the risks of war 
than men, a well-known observation from previous studies of public opinion.36 By contrast, perhaps 
surprisingly, there are no apparent gender gaps in perceptions of personal and community security. For 
example, ethnic minorities (defined as second generation immigrants) have higher levels of personal and 
community insecurity, not surprisingly given the concentration of many minorities in urban areas with social 
deprivation, as well as low-income jobs. Yet minorities are significantly less concerned about the risks of 
terrorism, civil conflict, or inter-state war. Thus we can conclude that many of the structural factors FOUR HORSEMEN  10/13/2011 10:10 AM 
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contributing to social inequality help to explain perceptions of security – but the effects are far stronger for 
feelings of personal security than for perceptions of national security.  
IV: The Consequences of Human Security for Cultural Change 
Why does Human Security matter? 
During the past 40 years, the world as a whole has experienced the highest rate of economic growth 
in recorded history, and massive improvements have been made in public health in most countries.  This 
implies that people’s basic values should be changing in those countries that have experienced rising Human 
Security—though not in countries that have declined or remained stagnant. This reflects our predictions for 
the second stage of Figure 1. 
A massive body of evidence tends to confirm this expectation.   Three different approaches point to 
this conclusion:  (1) cohort analysis; (2) cross-sectional comparisons of rich and poor countries; (3) 
examination of actual trends observed over the past four decades. Evidence from all three perspectives 
suggests that major cultural changes have occurred, and that they reflect a process of intergenerational change 
linked with rising levels of Human Security.   
[Figures 3 and 4 about here] 
The data collected for the 2011-2012 wave of the World Values Survey is, at this point, only available 
for a limited number of countries and types of societies, but nevertheless it can be pooled and used to 
illustrate some of these issues. Thus Figure 3 shows that without any prior controls, the measures of security 
in the current wave help to predict feelings of happiness and life satisfaction, both core aspects of well-being. 
Thus those with the greatest personal and community insecurity report that they are also not at all happy. By 
contrast, those who feel secure on both of these dimensions are more likely to be very happy. Interestingly, 
feelings of national security and insecurity do not seem to have similar effects in the countries under 
comparison, suggesting that the dimensions we have distinguished do have different consequences.  It 
remains to be seen whether these patterns hold once more countries with direct experience of conflict and 
war are included in the analysis. Similar relationships can be observed in the bottom part of Figure 3, with 
personal and community insecurity proving to be strongly related to life satisfaction. 
Figure 4 examines similar descriptive patterns linking perceptions of security with trust and social 
tolerance (using composite measures described in the appendix). Again, without any controls, perceptions of 
security can be observed to be related to both these attitudes. Thus both personal and community insecurity 
are clearly associated with levels of social trust, while national insecurity has a strong relationship with social 
tolerance. FOUR HORSEMEN  10/13/2011 10:10 AM 
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We cannot yet present the evidence which demonstrated the direct effects of perceptions of Human 
Security on cultural values at macro-level across all types of society, since data for the 6th Wave of the WVS is 
only currently available for a limited number of countries. Nevertheless we can analyze the effects of 
Materialist/Postmaterialist values which have been measured repeatedly in numerous surveys carried out 
since 1970, including each waves of the WVS from 1981 to 2009. 
Inglehart (1977, 1990, 1997) and Norris and Inglehart (2005) have argued that the exceptional 
prosperity and advanced welfare states that emerged in the postwar era, together with the long peace between 
developed democracies that has prevailed since World War II, brought unprecedentedly high levels of 
economic and physical security among the publics of advanced industrial societies-- which led to 
intergenerational value changes among these publics.  The largest relevant data base with the longest time 
series concerns the intergenerational shift from Materialist to Post-materialist values, where we have data 
from six West European countries that were surveyed at least once in most years from 1970 to the present.  
This data demonstrates that the younger birth cohorts, who were raised under the relatively conditions of the 
post-war economic miracles and welfare states, were much likelier to hold Post-materialist values than were 
the older birth cohorts in the same countries.  Cohort analysis indicates that these age-related differences do 
not simply reflect life-cycle effects: as each birth cohort aged during the four decades from 1970 to 2009, the 
younger birth cohorts did not take on the Materialist values that their older peers held; instead, they remained 
as Post-materialist in 2009 as they had been in 1970.  Consequently, as the younger birth cohorts gradually 
replaced the older ones in the adult population, the values of these six countries shifted from a 4:1 
preponderance of Materialists over Post-materialists in 1970, to a situation in which Post-materialists were at 
least as numerous as Materialists in 2009. Data from countries that have had stagnant or declining economies 
in recent decades do not show significant differences between the values of young and old, and do not show 
a rising proportion of Post-materialists. Their populations’ values remain overwhelmingly Materialist: the 
intergenerational shift toward Post-materialist values seems to occur only if a society has experienced rising 
levels of human security. 
But intergenerational value change is not a uniquely West European phenomenon.  It seems to occur 
whenever the formative experience of the younger birth cohorts are substantially different from those that 
shaped the older generations, so that the younger generation grows up under conditions that permit it to take 
survival for granted.  In 1970, this already applied to a sizeable part of the population of Western Europe 
together with the U.S., Canada, Australia and a few other countries.  But by 2009, many other countries, 
including Brazil, Russia, India and China, had been experiencing high growth rates for many years, and some 
of them were beginning to show substantial intergenerational value differences of the kind that were visible in 
Western countries in 1970. 
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V: Conclusions and discussion 
The four horsemen of the apocalypse, in the Book of Revelation, symbolize the catastrophic effects 
arising from conquest, war, famine and death.37 This Biblical vision reflects a pre-modern view of the life-
threatening risks facing the world. Considerable debate has surrounded the notion of Human Security, with 
proponents and critics disputing the coherence, utility and measurement of this concept. We believe that the 
shift from a narrow focus on military security toward the broader concept of Human Security is a natural 
response to the changing challenges facing developed societies, in which the cost-benefit ratio concerning 
inter-state war has become negative and cultural changes have made armed conflict among countries less 
acceptable.  The extent to which humans feel secure or insecure has a major impact on their values and 
behavior.  A revised version of modernization theory argues that  high levels of development bring increasing 
human security that lead to changes in motivations and behavior.   Economic growth generates much higher 
levels of per capita income, and the emergence of the welfare state makes these resources more widely and 
more predictably distributed. 
  Throughout most of history, most people have lived at the subsistence level.  Survival was insecure; 
food was chronically scarce, making fear of foreigners realistic. In recent decades, per capita income and life 
expectancy have risen substantially for most of the world’s population, and developed countries have been at 
peace with each other for the longest period in recorded history.  These developments have brought a rising 
sense of human security to a growing share of the world’s population, with far-reaching consequences.  At the 
same time, globalization and cultural change have heightened alternative concerns, such as environmental 
protection and human rights.  These developments reflect economic, technological and social changes linked 
with modernization. They have also contributed to the inter-state peace that has prevailed among democratic 
states for several decades. Since the end of the Cold War, security studies have broadened to take into 
account non-military threats, such as environmental scarcity and degradation, the spread of disease, 
overpopulation, refugee movements, nationalism, terrorism, and nuclear catastrophe, rather than focusing 
narrowly on external threats to states.  In this setting, valid measures of perceptions of Human Security have 
become essential, both to understand the determinants of Human Security among ordinary people, and to 
analyze their consequences.  
As long as the measurement of Human Security is limited to cross-national comparisons, however, it 
will fail to reflect the people-centric nature of the concept. Today, rich societies such as Norway, the United 
States and Japan have grown increasingly immune from life-threatening risks of extreme hunger, contagious 
diseases and armed violence. But a country’s wealth is not a guarantee of feelings of insecurity; even the 
richest societies are far from safe from all natural and manmade disasters.  In the global era, the effects of 
transnational threats such as climate change, terrorism and famine do not respect national borders. During 
recent decades, developing countries as diverse as Chile, China, and El Salvador have made remarkable FOUR HORSEMEN  10/13/2011 10:10 AM 
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progress by lifting millions of people out of poverty, expanding access to education, and extending longevity. 
The 2011 United Nations report on the Millennium Development Goals highlights the way that some of the 
poorest societies in sub-Saharan Africa, including Rwanda, Burundi, and Tanzania, have also made 
considerable strides towards achieving universal primary education  and health care.38 Deaths and casualties 
from civil wars have also fallen during the last two decades.39  In the same years, however, the lives of people 
living in many other societies have stagnated, or worsened, according to core developmental indicators.   
Around the globe, it is estimated by Paul Collier that a billion people living in some least developed societies 
remain vulnerable to extreme poverty and life-threatening risks.40 In order to understand how feelings of 
vulnerability, risks and threats differ among groups and social sectors, it is essential to disaggregate the 
analysis to the micro-level, and to monitor subjective feelings as well as objective indices. The new battery of 
items contained in the 6th wave of the World Values Survey moves towards this objective. 
This opens a new research agenda, but many issues await future analysis. This study provides some 
preliminary findings about the role of socioeconomic inequalities in driving perceptions of insecurity but it 
remains to be seen how far these patterns hold when a broader range of developing countries and countries 
emerging from conflict are included in the comparison.  This study also examined the impact of several social 
structural factors but we still need to establish how far perceptions of security can be explained by a range of 
macro-level indicators of violence and instability at national and community levels, as well as by both 
mediated coverage of risks (the so-called ‘mean world’ effect arising from exposure to television news and 
drama) and by the support provided by informal networks and the welfare state.  Perceptions of Human 
Security do not necessarily correspond to objective estimates of risk. Human fears are often ill-founded; thus, 
the public health literature indicates that people often exaggerate the degree of threat--but they also often 
under-estimate risks arising from life-style choices. Nevertheless, we predict that subjective perceptions of 
Human Security are important drivers of human behavior, affecting psychological feelings of well-being and 
happiness, as well as social and political values, with important societal consequences. FOUR HORSEMEN  10/13/2011 10:10 AM 
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Table 1: Public perceptions of security threats 
  Dimensions 
Community National  Personal 
COMMUNITY SECURITY: How frequently do the following things occur in your neighborhood?      
Drug sale in streets .788     
Alcohol consumed in the streets  .783     
Robberies .775     
Racist behavior  .744     
Police or military interfere with people’s private lives  .729     
Do you live in a secure neighborhood?  .519     
NATIONAL SECURITY: To what degree are you worried about the following situations?       
A terrorist attack    .922   
A war involving my country    .920   
A civil war    .890   
PERSONAL SECURITY: In the last 12 months, how often have you or your family…?       
 Gone without cash income.      .826 
 Gone without medicine or treatment      .818 
 Gone without enough food to eat      .801 
 Felt unsafe from crime in one's home.      .585 
Percentage of variance  26.1% 19.7%  18.9% 
Note: Extraction Method: Principal component factor analysis with varimax rotation and kaiser normalization. See the Technical Appendix for details about all survey 
items. 
Source: The World Values Survey 2010-11 (6th Wave): Preliminary release, September 2011 (7 countries N. 14,557). 
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Table 2.Perceptions of insecurity by nation 
 
Country   National insecurity  Community insecurity  Personal insecurity 
Japan 81  35  36 
Morocco 67  46  49 
South Korea  67  40  32 
Spain 64  40  32 
Sweden 40  40  29 
Trinidad and Tobago  59  46  39 
United States  59  40  37 
Total 64  40  35 
 
Note: Mean national scores on the standardized 100-point insecurity scales. See Table 1 for their components. 
Source: The World Values Survey 2010-11 (6th Wave): Preliminary release, September 2011 (7 countries N. 14,557) 
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Table 3: Explaining Perceptions of Insecurity   
 
 Personal  insecurity Community insecurity National insecurity
  b s.e. Beta Sig b s.e.  Beta Sig b s.e. Beta Sig
Sex   .025 .327 .001 N/s -.080 .329  -.003 N/s -1.80 .600 -.036 ***
Age  -.116 .011 -.131 *** -.172 .011  -.209 *** .015 .020 .010 N/s
Household income   -.663 .099 -.091 *** -.014 .099  -.002 N/s -.265 .181 -.022 N/s
Wealth (family savings 
during past year) 
-3.34 .191 -.202 *** -1.15 .192  -.075 *** -2.36 .351 -.087 ***
Education   -1.09 .071 -.180 *** -.588 .071 -.104 *** -.997 .130 -.100 ***
Subjective social class   -2.58 .235 -.154 *** -1.45 .236  -.093 *** -.431 .431 -.016 N/s
Marital status   -.202 .358 -.006 N/s -1.24 .360 -.042 *** 3.19 .656 .061 ***
Chief wage-earner employed   -1.22 .470 -.036 *** -2.60 .472 -.083 *** 1.85 .861 .033 *
Respondent employed  1.14 .411 .037 *** 1.00 .413 .035 ** -1.29 .754 -.025 N/s
Second generation 
immigrant  
1.59 .616 .028 ** 3.39 .619 .063 *** -5.95 1.129 -.063 ***
Constant  36.8 47.4   62.6
Adjusted R2  .218  .094   .035
Note: OLS regression models where the Personal Security standardized 100-point scale is the dependent variable. All models were checked with tolerance statistics to 
be free of multicollinearity. The columns represent the unstandardized beta coefficients (b), the Standard Error (s.e.), the Standardized Beta (B) and the statistical 
significance of the coefficients (P). *=>.05 **=>.01 ***=>.001. 
Source: The World Values Survey 2010-11 (6th Wave): Preliminary release, September 2011 (7 countries N. 14,557). 
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Figure 2: Perceptions of personal insecurity by household income and nation 
 
 
Source: The World Values Survey 2010-11 (6th Wave): Preliminary release, September 2011 (7 countries N. 14,557)INGLEHART AND NORRIS: SKYTTE LECTURE  10/13/2011 10:10 AM 
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Figure 3: Insecurity matters for well-being 
Source: The World Values Survey 2010-11 (6th Wave): Preliminary release, September 2011 (7 countries N. 14,557) 
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Figure 4: Insecurity matters for trust and tolerance 




Technical Appendix A 
1. Personal security index 
In the last 12 month, how often have you or your family Often Sometimes Rarely Never  DK/NA
V188. Gone without enough food to eat  1 2 3  4  -1
V189. Felt unsafe from crime in your home  1 2 3  4  -1
V190. Gone without medicine or medical treatment that 
you needed 
1 2 3 4 -1
V191. Gone without a cash income  1 2 3  4  -1
 
2. Community security index 










V171. Robberies  1 2 3 4  -1
V172. Alcohol consumption in the streets  1 2 3 4  -1
V173. Police or military interfere with people’s private life 1 2 3 4  -1
V174. Racist behavior  1 2 3 4  -1
V175. Drug sale in streets  1 2 3 4  -1
V170.  Could you tell me how secure do you feel these days in your neighborhood? 
Very secure  1
Quite secure  2
Not very secure  3
Not at all secure  4
DK/NA -1
 
3. National security index 






Not at all DK/
NA 
V183. A war involving my country   1 2 3 4  -1
V184. A terrorist attack  1 2 3 4  -1
V185. A civil war   1 2 3 4  -1
 
4. Social tolerance scale 
•  Do men make better political leaders than women? 
•  When jobs are scarce, do men have more right to a job than women? 
•  Is a university education more important for a boy than for a girl? 
•  When jobs are scarce, should employers give preference to people of (your nationality) over 
foreigners? 
•  Would you be willing to have a foreign worker/immigrant as a neighbor? 
•  Would you be willing to have someone of another religion as a neighbor? INGLEHART AND NORRIS: SKYTTE LECTURE  10/13/2011 10:10 AM 
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•  Would you be willing to have a homosexual as a neighbor? 
•  Is homosexuality ever acceptable? 
5. Social trust scale 
Composite scale of how much the respondent trusts their family, their neighborhood, people you know 
personally, people you meet for the first time, people of another religion, people of another nationality. 
6. Structural variables  Coding
Sex   Male=1, female=0
Age  In years (18-95)
Household income   Categorized scale from low income (1) to high (10) 
Family savings during past year   From spent savings and borrowed money (1) to save money (4) 
Education   Highest qualification:  No qualification (1) to university degree (9) 
Subjective social class   From lower class (1) to upper class (5)
Marital status   Married or living as married =1, or other status =0.   
Chief wage-earner employed   Paid work full-time or part-time=1, or other work status=0 
Respondent employed  Paid work full-time or part-time=1, or other work status=0 
Second generation immigrant   Mother or father immigrant=1, or else=0.
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